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Despite Nuclear Talks, Iran Is Still Far from Moderation

by December 3, 2021
written by

Newsweek     |     TED POE, FORMER U.S. REPRESENTATIVE     |     11/30/21

Negotiations to revive the 2015 Iran nuclear deal resumed in Vienna on Monday despite an uptick in the Islamic Republic’s malign activities. Earlier this month, Iranian forces seized an oil tanker in the Gulf of Oman and conducted comprehensive military exercises, showcasing various military assets including suicide drones like that used in the attempted assassination of Iraqi prime minister Mustafa al-Khadimi.

Mohammad Eslami, the new head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, recently boasted that the country had acquired even larger stockpiles of highly enriched uranium than the International Atomic Energy Agency had estimated in its most recent quarterly report. Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi surely appointed Eslami to the post on the understanding that he would antagonize Western adversaries and undermine the nuclear deal. He is only one of many appointees who embody the ultra-hardline stance of Iran’s new presidential administration.

Raisi’s own reputation and conduct make it extremely difficult to take seriously the announced return to nuclear talks. While some American policymakers are eager to take the proceedings in Vienna as a sign of the new administration’s cooperative tendencies, most know better. They have seen this before, and they know what the outcome will be.

Over 14 years in the U.S. Congress, I saw countless instances of Iranian officials receiving praise for their moderation only to later follow their hardline predecessors in threatening Western interests, undermining global security and violently repressing their own people. Most of my former colleagues have long since abandoned the notion that Iran’s behavior will change through the efforts of its own officials, and realized that such change is much more likely to come from pro-democracy activist groups within Iranian society.

At a Washington conference on Iran last month, former vice president Mike Pence identified some possible sources of change. He described Raisi’s appointment to the presidency as having been “intended to quash internal dissent and intimidate the people of Iran into remaining silent.” But he also noted that the choice of such an openly hardline leader is “a sign of the regime’s growing desperation and vulnerability” and its need to accelerate crackdowns on dissent.

As VP Pence stated, “one of the biggest lies the ruling regime has sold the world is that there is no alternative to the status quo. But there is an alternative—a well-organized, fully prepared, perfectly qualified and popularly supported alternative called the MEK.” Pence described the leader of this opposition movement, Mrs. Maryam Rajavi, as “an extraordinary woman” and “an inspiration to the world.” Pence is right. I dealt with this movement firsthand during my years in Congress, and I have personally met Mrs. Rajavi. It is time for America to invest in true partners in Iran, instead of pleading with the regime’s unpopular figureheads.

Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi speaks before parliament to defend his cabinet selection in the capital Tehran on August 21, 2021. – Iran’s parliament started reviewing ultraconservative President’s cabinet list in preparation for a vote of confidence expected next week, the assembly’s official media reported.

In January 2018, the Islamic Republic was rocked by a nationwide uprising that encompassed well over 100 cities and towns. Nearly 200 localities took part in another uprising in November 2019, and both movements featured slogans that condemned regime-approved “reformist” and “principlist” politicians as two sides of the same coin. Although the COVID-19 pandemic has since helped to keep a lid on large-scale unrest, Maryam Rajavi, who also addressed last month’s conference, has predicted that the era of the Raisi administration will be defined by an unprecedented increase in “hostility and enmity” between the Iranian regime and its people.

That “hostility and enmity” was on full display in the very election that brought Raisi to power in June 2021, as well as in the previous year’s parliamentary elections. The Iranian people conducted widespread electoral boycotts to show their dissatisfaction with Tehran’s hand-picked politicians.

By some accounts, less than 10 percent of Iran’s eligible voters actually cast votes for Raisi. Most avoided the sham process altogether while some deliberately submitted invalid ballots. The boycott reflected the same desire for change that had defined prior uprisings, but was further motivated by recognition of the leading candidate’s record of violating human rights and suppressing dissent. Raisi had a role in the massacre of 30,000 political prisoners in 1988 and in a crackdown on the 2019 uprising that killed at least 1,500 peaceful protesters.

As domestic conflict emerges in Iran, the international community will have to be prepared to take sides. Much of the world will look to the United States to demonstrate leadership in this regard. The U.S. should waste no time to show support for the Iranian people as they work to consolidate the legacy of the 2018 and 2019 uprisings, as well as the recent electoral boycotts.

Raisi’s past actions are clearly grounds for further sanctions on the Islamic Republic in general, and on the president in particular. They may also be grounds for prosecution at the International Criminal Court, in the event that the United Nations finally conducts a suitable investigation into 1988. The U.S. is in a strong position to take the lead on both issues.

The Western participants in the Iran nuclear deal recently met in Washington and reported having newfound confidence in their unity over Iran policy. Sadly, that unity will be wasted if it is solely directed toward negotiating with the Raisi administration in a futile attempt to foster moderate impulses within the current regime. Assertive policies from without, and pro-democracy pressure from within, are the only hope for wringing change from the Iranian government. Our goal should be to inspire the Iranian people to change that government, once and for all, from dictatorship to democracy.

Judge Ted Poe represented the Second district of Texas in the U.S. House of Representatives from 2005 to 2019 and is the former chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade in the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

https://www.newsweek.com/despite-nuclear-talks-iran-still-far-moderation-opinion-1653938

 

December 3, 2021 0 comments
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Tehran’s Spy Arrested in Sweden: A Grim Reminder of Rooted Terrorism in Europe

by October 18, 2021
written by

NCRI | Mahmoud Hakamian | Sept. 25, 2021

Swedish newspapers, including Aftonbladet and Expressen, reported that a former Swedish security police chief had been arrested for spying on behalf of the Iranian regime between 2011 and 2015. His arrest once again highlights the need for a joint-European action to address the Iranian regime’s terrorism. As identified by local and Persian language websites, the arrested spy is Peyman Kia, 40 years old. He had obtained Swedish citizenship and worked as a director in the Swedish Security Police (SPO) and an analyst in a Swedish military organization while he was spying for Tehran.
Kia was arrested on Monday. On Thursday, the court decided to order detention for this person on charges of grossly and unlawfully abusing his position as someone with access to classified information and violating national security to avoid him destroying documents or escaping. The arrested person is accused of espionage for reasonable reasons, the Swedish Security Service said in a statement.
His arrest comes a month after the arrest of an Iranian couple, who had obtained refugee status in Sweden by presenting a false Afghan identity. They were the agents of the regime’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).
In February 2021, a court in Antwerp, Belgium, condemned Assadollah Assadi and his three accomplices to nearly 70 years of prison for attempting to bomb the Iranian opposition’s rally in 2018 in France. Assadi was a Vienna-based diplomat-terrorist who had used his diplomatic privileges to smuggle 500 grams of the TATP explosives to Europe and handed over to his two operatives, Amir Sadouni and Nasimeh Na’ami. Sadoun and Na’ami, along with another operative, Mehrdad Arefani, had obtained Belgian citizenship and posed as supporters of the Iranian opposition movement.
Assadi’s trial and conviction once again highlighted what the Iranian Resistance had said for years: the regime’s embassies and diplomats are promoting terrorism and espionage. During Assadi’s trial, the authorities in Germany, where Assadi was arrested in 2018, opened another case about a network of terrorism and espionage he had managed across Europe. The German officials found a notebook in Assadi’s car with important information about the 2018 bomb plot, Assadi’s actions travel, and the amounts of money he had given to different operatives.

“The Iranian Resistance has specific information of the Iranian regime’s sleeper cells across Europe, which Assadi commanded. The Iranian regime’s MOIS has a network of agents in Europe supported by the regime’s embassies that misuse their diplomatic facilities. Assadollah Assadi was at the head of the Iranian regime’s intelligence network in Europe,” Mr. Javad Dabiran, the deputy director of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) representative office in Germany, told Al-Arabiya on January 22. “40% and specifically 144 out of 289 meetings of Assadi with his agents were held in Germany. This implies two things. First, a large part of [the regime’s] network is located in Germany, and Germany is the scene of the Iranian regime’s terrorist activities,” Mr. Dabiran added.
On the eve of Assadi’s conviction, another plot of the MOIS against the Iranian Resistance in Germany was revealed. The regime had tried to persuade Iranians residing in Germany to spy on the NCRI’s office in Germany and Javad Dabiran, then receive “good money.”
The recent arrest of another spy in Sweden, holding a top security position, is the most recent in chains to arresting the regime’s spies in Europe. It also implies how rooted the regime’s espionage network is in Europe, overshadowed by the European leader’s persistence on the failed appeasement policy toward Tehran.
In July 2017, Ali Fallahian, the former head of the MOIS, acknowledged in an interview how the regime’s agents work under many covers in Europe. “The ministry needs cover for its works to collect information both inside the country and outside. Obviously, we don’t send an agent to Germany or America and, for example, say, ok, I am an agent of the information ministry, and I am here to collect information, please give that to me. He would work under cover of business or other jobs, including reporters. You know many of our reporters are the MOIS agents,” Falahian said.

Arrested Iranian agent Kaveh Lotfolah Afrasiabi in U.S. is the tip of the iceberg
As revealed during Assadi’s trial, the Iranian regime is involved in terrorism at top levels. On April 28, 2021, the regime’s then-president Hassan Rouhani confirmed the regime’s Supreme National Security Council takes all decisions regarding Tehran’s malign activities.
“All the complex issues of foreign policy and the field of defense are discussed in the Supreme National Security Council, whether when we want to [carry out] a defensive operation and whether when we have to carry out an offensive operation somewhere or whether when we want to undertake an important political task,” Rouhani acknowledged.
Before Rouhani, his Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, who oversaw the 2018 bombing plot led by Assadi in Europe, acknowledged how his Ministry is entirely involved in terrorism and espionage in a leaked audiotape.
What you should know about Iran’s network of terrorists and spies in EU

“Most of our Foreign Ministry ambassadors have a security structure. Our Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been facing security issues since it began operating. The Foreign Ministry’s agenda has been a political-security agenda since the beginning of the revolution. In the 1990s, they closed down the Ministry’s economic directorate and instead created regional directors whose tendencies were more political and security-related,” Zarif said. The European officials should take the recent arrest of another spy in Sweden seriously and consider it a mounting threat of terrorism from the regime.
Unfortunately, the European leaders are more concerned about keeping the dialogue with the Terrorist regime in Tehran. This comes when the regime’s new government does not have the “moderate” façade anymore. The new Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, has been considered a “field agent” and is a known member of the terrorist “Quds Force.” Yet, the EU leaders, particularly Josep Borrell, the EU’s chief diplomat, did not lose the chance of meeting and praising Amir-Abdollahian and the terrorist regime he represents during the recent United Nations General Assembly.

The EU leaders should adopt a firm policy toward the regime. Appeasing this regime would only embolden it to continue its terrorist activities. As the Iranian Resistance has reiterated, the EU should close down the regime’s embassies and expel its agents operating in the European Union under various pretexts. This would certainly increase the security of the EU’s citizens.

https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/tehrans-spy-arrested-in-sweden-a-grim-reminder-of-rooted-terrorism-in-europe/

 

October 18, 2021 0 comments
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Iranian Intelligence Officials Indicted on Kidnapping Conspiracy Charges

by July 18, 2021
written by

Department of Justice     |     July 13, 2021

Iranian Intelligence Services Allegedly Plotted to Kidnap a U.S. Journalist and Human Rights Activist from New York City for Rendition to Iran

A New York federal court unsealed an indictment today charging four Iranian nationals with conspiracies related to kidnapping, sanctions violations, bank and wire fraud, and money laundering. A co-conspirator and California resident, also of Iran, faces additional structuring charges.

According to court documents, Alireza Shavaroghi Farahani, aka Vezerat Salimi and Haj Ali, 50; Mahmoud Khazein, 42; Kiya Sadeghi, 35; and Omid Noori, 45, all of Iran, conspired to kidnap a Brooklyn journalist, author and human rights activist for mobilizing public opinion in Iran and around the world to bring about changes to the regime’s laws and practices. Niloufar Bahadorifar, aka Nellie Bahadorifar, 46, originally of Iran and currently residing in California, is alleged to have provided financial services that supported the plot.

“Every person in the United States must be free from harassment, threats and physical harm by foreign powers,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Mark J. Lesko for the Justice Department’s National Security Division. “Through this indictment, we bring to light one such pernicious plot to harm an American citizen who was exercising their First Amendment rights, and we commit ourselves to bring the defendants to justice.”

“As alleged, four of the defendants monitored and planned to kidnap a U.S. citizen of Iranian origin who has been critical of the regime’s autocracy, and to forcibly take their intended victim to Iran, where the victim’s fate would have been uncertain at best,” said U.S. Attorney Audrey Strauss for the Southern District of New York. “Among this country’s most cherished freedoms is the right to speak one’s mind without fear of government reprisal. A U.S. citizen living in the United States must be able to advocate for human rights without being targeted by foreign intelligence operatives. Thanks to the FBI’s exposure of their alleged scheme, these defendants have failed to silence criticism by forcible abduction.”

“As alleged in this indictment, the government of Iran directed a number of state actors to plot to kidnap a U.S.-based journalist and American citizen, and to conduct surveillance on U.S. soil – all with the intention to lure our citizen back to Iran as retaliation for their freedom of expression,” said Assistant Director Alan E. Kohler Jr. of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division. “We will use all the tools at our disposal to aggressively investigate foreign activities by operatives who conspire to kidnap a U.S. citizen just because the government of Iran didn’t approve of the victim’s criticism of the regime.”

According to the indictment, Farahani is an Iranian intelligence official who resides in Iran. Khazein, Sadeghi and Noori are Iranian intelligence assets who also reside in Iran and work under Farahani. Since at least June 2020, Farahani and his intelligence network have plotted to kidnap a U.S. citizen of Iranian origin (Victim-1) from within the United States in furtherance of the government of Iran’s efforts to silence Victim-1’s criticisms of the regime. Victim-1 is an author and journalist who has publicized the government of Iran’s human rights abuses.

Prior to the kidnapping plot, the government of Iran attempted to lure Victim-1 to a third country in order to capture Victim-1 for rendition to Iran. In approximately 2018, Iranian government officials attempted to induce relatives of Victim-1, who reside in Iran, to invite the victim to travel to a third country for the apparent purpose of having Victim-1 arrested or detained and transported to Iran for imprisonment. Victim-1’s relatives did not accept the offer. An electronic device used by Farahani contains, among other things, a photo of Victim-1 alongside photos of two other individuals, both of whom were lured from third countries and captured by Iranian intelligence, with one later executed and the other imprisoned in Iran, and a caption in Farsi that reads: “gradually the gathering gets bigger… are you coming, or should we come for you?”

On multiple occasions in 2020 and 2021, as part of the plot to kidnap Victim-1, Farahani and his network procured the services of private investigators to surveil, photograph and video record Victim-1 and Victim-1’s household members in Brooklyn. Farahani’s network procured days’ worth of surveillance at Victim-1’s home and the surrounding area, videos and photographs of the victim’s family and associates, surveillance of the victim’s residence, and the installation of and access to a live high-definition video feed of Victim-1’s home. The network repeatedly insisted on high-quality photographs and video recordings of Victim-1 and Victim-1’s household members; a large volume of content; pictures of visitors and objects around the house; and depictions of Victim-1’s body language. The network procured the surveillance by misrepresenting their identities and the purpose of the surveillance to the investigators, and laundered money into the United States from Iran to pay for the surveillance. Sadeghi acted as the network’s primary point of contact with private investigators while Noori facilitated payment to the investigators in furtherance of the plot.

As part of the kidnapping plot, the Farahani-led intelligence network also researched methods of transporting Victim-1 out of the United States for rendition to Iran. Sadeghi, for example, researched a service offering military-style speedboats for self-operated maritime evacuation out of New York City, and maritime travel from New York to Venezuela, a country whose de facto government has friendly relations with Iran. Khazein researched travel routes from Victim-1’s residence to a waterfront neighborhood in Brooklyn; the location of Victim-1’s residence relative to Venezuela; and the location of Victim-1’s residence relative to Tehran.

The network that Farahani directs has also targeted victims in other countries, including victims in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates, and has worked to procure similar surveillance of those victims.

As alleged, Bahadorifar provided financial and other services from the United States to Iranian residents and entities, including to Khazein, since approximately 2015. Bahadorifar facilitated access to the U.S. financial system and institutions through the use of card accounts and offered to manage business interests in the United States on Khazein’s behalf. Among other things, Bahadorifar caused a payment to be made to a private investigator for surveillance of Victim-1 on Khazein’s behalf. While Bahadorifar is not charged with participating in the kidnapping conspiracy, she is alleged to have provided financial services that supported the plot and is charged with conspiring to violate sanctions against Iran, commit bank and wire fraud, and commit money laundering. Bahadorifar is also charged with structuring cash deposits totaling more than approximately $445,000.

Farahani, Khazein, Sadeghi and Noori are each charged with: (1) conspiring to kidnap, which carries a maximum sentence of life in prison; (2) conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and sanctions against the government of Iran, which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison; (3) conspiring to commit bank and wire fraud, which carries a maximum sentence of 30 years in prison; and (4) conspiring to launder money, which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison. Bahadorifar is charged with counts two, three and four, and is further charged with structuring, which carries a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

The FBI’s New York Field Office, Counterintelligence-Cyber Division and Iran Threat Task Force are investigating the case.

Trial Attorney Nathan Swinton of the Justice Department’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Michael D. Lockard, Jacob H. Gutwillig and Matthew J.C. Hellman of the Southern District of New York are prosecuting the case.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/iranian-intelligence-officials-indicted-kidnapping-conspiracy-charges

 

July 18, 2021 0 comments
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